Гадания на газетной гуще (1939)

[lafeber]

Историки всё еще пытаются прояснить, что творилось в голове у Сталина-Молотова весной-летом 1939 года. На сей раз анализируют сталинский вклад в газетные статьи мая 1939. Какая-то печатная движуха началась 10-11 мая, и изучение ее позволяет историкам высказывать мнение, что «острая критика политики западных держав на страницах советских газет неплохо ориентировала немецких дипломатов, военное и политическое руководство нацистского рейха относительно перспектив соглашения между СССР и западными державами».

По ссылке вы найдете свежую статью из журнала «Российская история», 2019. № 6. Автор - Владимир Невежин.
https://paul-atrydes.livejournal.com/223773.html


CITATION: В публикации [от 11 мая] утверждалось, что Советский Союз не имел пакта о взаимопомощи с Францией. Между тем ещё действовал франко-советский договор от 1935

Набрали с улицы по объявлению. :)

Comments

[tijd]

Для США май 1939 был в некотором смысле поворотным.

6 мая 1939 выходит фильм “Confessions of a Nazi Spy”. Это первая откровенно анти-нацистская картина: Голливуд объявляет войну Гитлеру.

27 мая 1939 арестован Фриц Кун, фюрер американских нацистов. Это прерывает наметившийся рост влияния его организации (Бунда).

Arrested yesterday in a Pennsylvania village, Fritz Kuhn, leader of the German-American Bund, was placed in the New York police line-up today and arraigned in General Sessions Court on an indictment charging him with embezzling sums of money totaling $14,548.59 from the Bund. He pleaded not guilty and was held by Judge Cornelius F. Collins in bail of $5,000.
The indictment against Kuhn was handed up yesterday. Three New York detectives trailed him to Pennsylvania, where he was arrested and waived extradition. District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey, who obtained the indictment, said “the indictment shows that Kuhn is just a common thief.” He added that it looked very much as if Kuhn were in flight when arrested.
https://www.jta.org/1939/05/28/archive/fritz-kuhn-held-in-5000-bail-as-embezzler-of-bund-funds

The Bund did not wish to have Kuhn prosecuted, because of Führerprinzip, the principle that the leader had absolute power. Nevertheless, with the implicit blessing of the White House, Dewey decided to go ahead and prosecute.
On December 5, 1939, Kuhn was sentenced to two-and-a-half to five years in jail for tax evasion. On December 11, 1941, while he was locked away in Sing Sing prison, Germany declared war on the U.S. Kuhn’s support for a government now actively hostile to America gave the federal government the pretext to revoke his citizenship, which it did on June 1, 1943. Upon Kuhn’s release from prison three weeks later, he was immediately re-arrested as a dangerous enemy agent. While Kuhn was in U.S. custody in Texas, Nazi Germany was destroyed, its quest for global domination permanently halted, and Hitler was dead. Four months after V-E Day, the U.S. deported Kuhn to war-ravaged West Germany. His dreams of a Swastika Nation had been smashed to pieces. He died in Munich in 1951, a broken man, in exile from the country he had sought to “liberate.”
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/23/nazi-german-american-bund-rally-madison-square-garden-215522

В конце мая 1939 США отказываются принять незваные корабли с еврейскими беженцами из Европы. Им приходится возвращаться обратно, а их пассажирам - отправляться в концлагеря.
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/seeking-refuge-in-cuba-1939

[lafeber]

>> 6 мая 1939 выходит фильм “Confessions of a Nazi Spy”. Это первая откровенно анти-нацистская картина: Голливуд объявляет войну Гитлеру.

Не только анти-нацистские фильмы тогда снимали. Советскому Союзу тоже доставалось. В конце 1939 вышла "Ниночка".

>> В конце мая 1939 США отказываются принять незваные корабли с еврейскими беженцами из Европы. Им приходится возвращаться обратно, а их пассажирам - отправляться в концлагеря.

Всё же то решение принималось тогда, когда про концлагеря не было известно и ограничения по эмиграции в США были жесткими. Даже после войны антиэмигрантские законы продолжали действовать и освобожденных из доказанных концлагерей евреев США отказывались принимать в 1946.

[tijd]

В конце 1939 вышла "Ниночка".

Точно, было такое.

Во время войны в Голливуде сделали несколько откровенно про-советских фильмов, за что потом пришлось отдуваться в Конгрессе (HUAC). Из показаний рожденного в Минске Луиса Майерa из студии Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer с оправданием за картину "Song of Russia":

Mr. Mayer. Communism is based upon a doctrine inconsistent with American liberty. It advocates destruction of the system of free enterprise under which our industry has achieved popularity among the freedom-loving peoples of the world.
Our hatred of communism is returned in full measure. The Communists attack our screen as an instrument of capitalism. Few, if any, of our films ever reach Russia. It hates us because it fears us. We show too much of the American way of life, of human dignity, of the opportunity and the happiness to be enjoyed in a democracy.
More than any other country in the world, we have enjoyed the fullest freedom of speech in all means of communication. It is this freedom that has enabled the motion picture to carry the message to the world of our democratic way of life.
The primary function of motion pictures is to bring entertainment to the screen. But, like all other industries, we were lending every support to our Government in the war effort, and whenever a subject could be presented entertaining, we tried, insofar as possible, to cooperate in building morale.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer produced Joe Smith American as a defense-worker incentive. There were a number of films produced for the Army and Navy. Then, there was Mrs. Miniver, which was rushed into release at the urgent request of the United States officials to meet the rising tide of anti-English feeling that followed the fall of Tobruk.
There were a number of representatives of the Government who made periodical visits to the studios during the war. They discussed with us from time to time the types of pictures which they felt might assist the war effort. They were coordinators and at no time did they attempt to tell us what we should or should not do. We made our own decisions on production. We are proud of our war efforts and the results speak for themselves.
Mention has been made of the picture Song of Russia, as being friendly to Russia at the time it was made. Of course it was. It was made to be friendly. In 1938 we made Ninotchka, and shortly thereafter Comrade X, with Clark Gable and Hedy Lamarr—both of these films kidded Russia.
It was in April of 1942 that the story for Song of Russia came to our attention. It seemed a good medium of entertainment and at the same time offered an opportunity for a pat on the back for our then ally, Russia. It also offered an opportunity to use the music of Tschaikowsky. We mentioned this to the Government coordinators and they agreed with us that it would be a good idea to make the picture.
According to research I have made, our newspapers were headlining the desperate situation of the Russians at Stalingrad at that time. Admiral Standley, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, made a vigorous plea for all-out aid. He pleaded for assistance second only to the supplies being provided the United States Fleet, and emphasized that the best way to win the war was to keep the Russians killing the Germans, and that the most effective way was to give them all the help they needed.
The United States Army Signal Corps made The Battle of Stalingrad, released in 1943, with a prolog expressing high tribute from President Roosevelt, our Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and from Generals Marshall and MacArthur.
The final script of Song of Russia was little more than a pleasant musical romance—the story of a boy and girl that, except for the music of Tschaikowsky might just as well have taken place in Switzerland or England or any other country on the earth.
I though Robert Taylor ideal for the leading male role in Song of Russia, but he did not like the story. This was not unusual as actors and actresses many times do not care for stories suggested to them.
At the time, Taylor mentioned his pending commission in the Navy, so I telephoned the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, and told him of the situation, recalling the good that had been accomplished with Mrs. Miniver and other pictures released during the war period. The Secretary called back and said he thought Taylor could be given time to make the film before being called to the service. Accordingly, Taylor made the picture.
Since 1942 when the picture was planned, our relationship with Russia has changed. But viewed in the light of the war emergency at the time, it is my opinion that it could not be construed as anything other than for the entertainment purpose intended and a pat on the back for our then ally, Russia.
I am proud of the motion-picture industry; proud of its record in war and peace. With press and radio, it shares today a solemn trust to preserve our sacred freedom of speech and fight with our every energy any attempt to use that freedom as a cloak for subversive assassins of liberty.

В свою очередь, Джек Уорнер из студии Warner Bros. оправдывал создание про-сталинского фильма "Mission to Moscow" опасением о том, что, если Сталина не поддержать, он восстановит пакт с Гитлером.

Mr. Stripling. I will be very frank with you. The charge is often made and many statements have been made to the committee to the effect that Mission to Moscow was made at the request of our Government as a so-called appeasement or pap to the Russians; in other words, it was produced at the request of the Government. Now, is such a statement without foundation?
Mr. Warner. I see what you mean. No, it is not without foundation. That is why I am very happy you put it that way. In order to answer that question correctly, I would say there were rumors and many stories to the effect that if Stalingrad fell Stalin would again join up with Hitler because, naturally, the way the stories were that far back, during the hardest days of the war, from what I could get out of it, is that the authorities in Washington who were conducting the war were afraid if Stalin would take up with Hitler they would destroy the world, not only continental Europe and Russia, but Japan and everything else.
And we know what the scheme of things was, that the Japs and Germans were to meet in India or Egypt, I forget just which.
Mr. Thomas. Do you mean to say some of the Government officials in Washington informed you that they were fearful that Stalin might hook up with Hitler?
Mr. Warner. No; but that was the tenor of things. It would be pretty hard for me to say that someone told me that, but that was just the general feeling in Washington. Every time I would go there that would be it.
Mr. Thomas. Mr. Stripling asked a question that I don't think we have had an answer to yet.
Mr. Stripling. Let me state further, Mr. Chairman, it has also been charged that this film had the tacit approval, if not the request, of the White House.
Mr. Warner, was there anything that occurred prior to the production of this film which led you to believe that the Government, the Federal Government, desired that this film be made as a contribution to the war effort. In other words, what 1 want to make clear, there is no desire on the part of the committee to put you or your company on the spot for making Mission to Moscow, but if it was made, as in other films, at the request of the Government as a- so-called patriotic duty, you would have no other course to follow and you would naturally expected to do so.
Mr. Warner. The general feeling as I found it in Washington was a tremendous fear that Stalin might go back with Hitler because he had done it before.
Mr. Thomas. No. What we want to get at is the reason, not the general feelings.
Mr. Warner. Yes, but I am just going to come back to that.
Mr. Thomas. All right.
Mr. Warner. The Russians were very discouraged and they figured that the United States was not going to back them up with lend-lease and so on and so forth in sufficient quantities to beat Hitler, which was very, very important to civilization, and the feeling was if a film could be made—and I imagine other things were being done—to assure the Russians and Stalin.
Mr. Thomas. Can't you be more specific? You say a feeling existed.
Mr. Warner. Yes.
Mr. Thomas. We want to know more about the specific thing, something more than just a general feeling. We want to know the persons in the Government who got in touch with you concerning the making of this film.
Mr. Warner. Well, I don't think Mr. Davies was in the Government then. He was then ex-Ambassador to Russia and almost everything was dealt through him.
Mr. Thomas. Did anyone in the State Department get in touch with you?
Mr. Warner. No. not directly in touch ; no, sir.
Mr. Thomas. Not directly in touch?
Mr. Warner. Do you mean did anyone in the White House say we should make the film for reasons along those lines?
Mr. Thomas. Directly or indirectly.
Mr. Warner. Well, as I understood at the time through Mr. Davies that he had contacted the White House and for all of the reasons I recited it was good for the defense and for the prosecution of the war to keep the Russians in there fighting until the proper time when the United States and Britain could organize, in other words, give us time to prepare.
Mr. Thomas. Let's have the date you started producing that film.
Mr. Warner. We started November 9, 1942.
Mr. Thomas. And you completed production when?
Mr. Warner. On February 2. 1943. It took a little under 4 months.
https://archive.org/details/hearingsregardin1947aunit

Показания пришлось давать также Рональду Рейгану, как лидеру актерского профсоюза https://puppet-djt.livejournal.com/140089.html

ограничения по эмиграции в США были жесткими

Трагедия была в том, что даже существовавшие квоты на иммиграцию из разных стран не были полностью заполнены.

"In 1939, the quota allowed for 27,370 German citizens to immigrate to the United States. In 1938, more than 300,000 Germans-mostly Jewish refugees-had applied for U.S. visas (entry permits). A little over 20,000 applications were approved."
https://tijd.livejournal.com/29367.html

Публика была настроена против приема беженцев, а Рузвельт не рвался раскачивать лодку.

Gallup's first questions about refugees were asked in January 1939, just a couple of months after the Nov. 9-10 events, which came to be known as Kristallnacht, when Nazi party officials, Hitler Youth and other Germans carried out waves of violence against Jewish synagogues, cemeteries, businesses and Jewish residents in their homes. The events accelerated the attempts of European Jews to flee Germany and proximate countries and to emigrate to nations such as the U.S. The basic question Gallup asked related specifically to refugee children: "It has been proposed that the government permit 10,000 refugee children from Germany to be brought into this country and taken care of in American homes. Do you favor this plan?" A second question asked of a different sample was basically the same as above, but included the phrase "most of them Jewish" and ended with, "should the government permit these children to come in?"
It didn't matter much whether or not the refugee children were identified as Jewish. A clear majority, 67% of Americans, opposed the basic idea, and a lower 61% were opposed in response to the question that included the phrase "most of them Jewish."
This opposition reflected, in some ways, Americans' strong isolationist attitudes at this juncture in history. Separate Gallup polling in December 1939, after the war began with the German invasion of Poland, showed a startling 96% of Americans said the United States should not declare war on Germany and send the Army and Navy abroad to fight. In early 1940, 77% said that the U.S. should not get involved, even if it "appears that Germany is defeating England and France."
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/186716/historical-review-americans-views-refugees-coming.aspx

[lafeber]

>> Публика была настроена против приема беженцев, а Рузвельт не рвался раскачивать лодку.


Рузвельт работал в свое время в правительстве Вильсона (зам. морского секретаря) и он видел, как легко изоляционистская реакция в стране смяла Вильсона. Рузвельт не желал повторять ошибок Вильсона и поэтому не делал резких шагов до поры до времени: общество сперва само должно захотеть влезть в мировую политику. Т.е. вопрос с беженцами для него был ложной целью.

[tijd]

Вклад Рузвельта в дело беженцев был в организации Эвианской конференции в июле 1938. В это время Гитлер давал понять, что собирается очистить Германию (и Австрию) от евреев, но готов их выслать в любую страну, которая согласится их принять. Ко всеобщему позору таких стран не нашлось. Чтобы слишком не светиться, Рузвельт послал на конференцию специального представителя (Майрона Тейлора) вместо официальных лиц.

Following the Anschluss, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called for an international conference that would discuss the plight of refugees seeking to flee Nazi Germany and establish an international organization to work for an overall solution to the refugee problem. In early July 1938, delegates from 32 countries and a number of non-governmental aid organizations met at the French resort of Evian on Lake Geneva. Roosevelt chose Myron C. Taylor, a businessman and close friend, to represent the United States at the conference.
During the nine-day meeting, delegate after delegate rose to express sympathy for the refugees. But most countries, including the United States and Great Britain, offered excuses for not letting in more refugees. Only the Dominican Republic agreed to accept additional refugees. This offer came as President Rafael Trujillo sought both to rehabilitate his reputation following his government's massacre of Black Haitians in 1937 and to bring white wealth into his country. Commenting on the Evian Conference, the German government gleefully noted how "astounding" it was that foreign countries criticized Germany for its treatment of the Jews, yet none of them opened their doors.
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/emigration-and-the-evian-conference

В 1939 Элеонора Рузвельт публично поддержала законопроект Вагнера-Роджерса о временном увеличении иммиграционной квоты для приема детей-беженцев. Но в обстановке того времени законопроект был обречён и не дошёл до голосования.

On February 9, 1939, Democratic senator Robert Wagner of New York and Republican congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts sponsored identical bills in the US Senate and House of Representatives to admit 20,000 German refugee children under the age of fourteen over a two-year period. The bills, written by Pickett and his interfaith colleagues, specified that 10,000 children each fiscal year (1939 and 1940) would enter the United States and not be counted against the existing immigration quota laws. Although the bill did not indicate that the “German refugee children” would mostly be Jewish children, the realities of the refugee crisis in Europe made this an obvious and understood fact. The bill specified that when the refugee children reached the age of eighteen, they would either be counted against that year’s German immigration quota or would return to Europe.
The Wagner-Rogers Bill’s authors tried to anticipate and address criticism by enlisting powerful allies. The American Federation of Labor supported the bill, claiming that the children would not add to the nation’s existing unemployment problem. The Children’s Bureau, an agency within the US Department of Labor, agreed to supervise the placement and care of the children. The Non-Sectarian Committee for German Refugee Children, headed by Pickett, promised that the children would be supported with private donations.
For the first time in her six years as first lady, Eleanor Roosevelt allowed reporters to directly quote her in support of pending legislation. Referring to the ongoing Kindertransports, which brought German refugee children to Great Britain and western Europe, the First Lady said: “England, France, and the Scandinavian countries are taking their share of these children and I think we should.” She also referred to the bill as a “wise way to do a humanitarian act.” Despite Mrs. Roosevelt’s urging, President Roosevelt never publicly commented on the Wagner-Rogers Bill.
The leaders of American Jewish organizations rarely lobbied for the bill publicly, perhaps because they were concerned that any attempt to prioritize aid for Jewish refugee children might spark increased antisemitism in the United States. Senator Wagner and Congresswoman Rogers, neither of whom were Jewish, emphasized that their bill would admit both German Jewish and Christian children, but opponents quickly branded the legislation as an effort to help Jewish refugee children primarily.
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/wagner-rogers-bill

Изменению общественного мнения в США в 1940 способствовала сеть британских «агентов влияния», которые действовали под молчаливым покровительством Рузвельта. Те же люди (в частности канадец Уильям Стивенсон) помогли созданию OSS, предшественника ЦРУ.

Churchill's task, as he himself saw it, was clear: somehow, in some way, the great mass of the population of the US had to be persuaded that it was in their interests to join the war in Europe, that to sit on the sidelines was in some way un-American. And so British Security Coordination came into being.
BSC was set up by a Canadian entrepreneur called William Stephenson, working on behalf of the British Secret Intelligence Services (SIS). An office was opened in the Rockefeller Centre in Manhattan with the discreet compliance of Roosevelt and J Edgar Hoover of the FBI. But nobody on the American side of the fence knew what BSC's full agenda was nor, indeed, what would be the massive scale of its operations. What eventually occurred as 1940 became 1941 was that BSC became a huge secret agency of nationwide news manipulation and black propaganda. Pro-British and anti-German stories were planted in American newspapers and broadcast on American radio stations, and simultaneously a campaign of harassment and denigration was set in motion against those organisations perceived to be pro-Nazi or virulently isolationist (such as the notoriously anti-British America First Committee - it had more than a million paid-up members).
Stephenson called his methods "political warfare", but the remarkable fact about BSC was that no one had ever tried to achieve such a level of "spin", as we would call it today, on such a vast and pervasive scale in another country. The aim was to change the minds of an entire population: to make the people of America think that joining the war in Europe was a "good thing" and thereby free Roosevelt to act without fear of censure from Congress or at the polls in an election.
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/aug/19/military.secondworldwar

Голливуд тоже подключился - Майер упоминает фильм “Mrs. Miniver” про жизнь английской домохозяйки, разрушенную войной. Его начали снимать осенью 1940, а выпустили в 1942. Фильм получил шесть Оскаров и, по словам Черчиля, стоил пяти линкоров.

A scene near the end – in which a vicar delivers a sermon in a bombed-out church – was rewritten by Wyler and Henry Wilcoxon, the actor playing the vicar, the night before it was filmed. President Roosevelt requested that it be translated into several languages and air-dropped over German-occupied territory; it was also reprinted in Time and Look magazines.
The ultimate endorsement came from an unlikely source. Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels wrote that Mrs Miniver “shows the destiny of a family during the current war, and its refined powerful propagandistic tendency has up to now only been dreamed of. There is not a single angry word spoken against Germany; nevertheless the anti-German tendency is perfectly accomplished.”
https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20150209-the-film-that-goebbels-feared

Церковная проповедь из фильма:

“It is the war of the people, of all the people. And it must be fought not only on the battlefield, but in the cities and in the villages, in the factories and on the farms, in the home and in the heart of every man, woman, and child who loves freedom. Well, we have buried our dead, but we shall not forget them. Instead, they will inspire us with an unbreakable determination to free ourselves, and those who come after us, from the tyranny and terror that threaten to strike us down. This is the People's War. It is our war. We are the fighters. Fight it, then! Fight it with all that is in us! And may God defend the right.”
https://youtu.be/0VmIIpLCw6g

[lafeber]

Интересно, спасибо.

[lafeber]

Записка в Комитет партийного контроля от, кажется, 1967 года.

https://paul-atrydes.livejournal.com/229559.html

[lafeber]

Сталин и Война,

Л.М. СПИРИН, доктор исторических наук, профессор

Вопросы истории КПСС. 1990. № 5.

Сталин читает про Кромвеля, ВФР и Коммуну, а также основных военных теоретиков. Читает
незадолго до ВМВ. Сталин - формалист, многое понял не так и поверхностно. Пример того, что чтение не помогло.

https://paul-atrydes.livejournal.com/326469.html